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**An Analysis of the Marine Corps Reserve Appropriations
(1960-1999)**

by

Michael J. Taylor
Captain, United States Marine Corps
B.A., Northwestern University, 1983

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

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19 Abstract (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
This thesis is an analysis of the Marine Corps Reserve appropriations. The purpose of this thesis is to look at the relationships between the active and reserve components within the Marine Corps from the perspective of the funds appropriated by Congress. The research examines the history of the Marine Corps Reserve appropriations from 1960 to the post Cold War era (1990's). Of particular concern is how the Marine Corps Reserve has fared in an environment of shrinking Department of Defense resources. Addressed will be the impact of the Total Force Policy, the Base Force concept, and the Bottom-Up review on the Marine Corps Reserve. In order to show trends, similarities, and differences, the budget data for both the active and reserve components is analyzed, i.e., end strength, personnel funding, and operation and maintenance funding. The data is analyzed within the framework of decades, i.e., the 1960's, 1970's, 1980's, and 1990's. This research will show that the Marine Corps Reserve has not only grown in size, but also in its ability to augment, reconstitute, and reinforce the active component.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is an analysis of the Marine Corps Reserve appropriations. The purpose of this thesis is to look at the relationship between the active and reserve components within the Marine Corps from the perspective of the funds appropriated by Congress. The research examines the history of the Marine Corps reserve appropriations from 1960 to the post Cold War era (1990's). Of particular concern is how the Marine Corps Reserve has fared in an environment of shrinking Department of Defense resources. Addressed will be the impact of the Total Force Policy, the Base Force concept, and the Bottom-Up review on the Marine Corps Reserve. In order to show trends, similarities, and differences, the budget data for both the active and reserve components is analyzed, i.e., end strength, personnel funding, and operation and maintenance funding. The data is analyzed within the framework of decades, i.e., the 1960's, 1970's, 1980's, and 1990's. This research will show that the Marine Corps Reserve has not only grown in size, but also in its ability to augment, reconstitute, and reinforce the active component.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

Since 1916, when President Woodrow Wilson signed an Act of Congress officially appropriating funds for the Marine Corps Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve has served a critical role in the security of the United States. From the first utilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in World War I to the reserves who served in Desert Storm/Shield, the Marine Corps Reserve has always provided qualified units and individuals to support the active component when necessary. The purpose of this thesis is to take a look at the relationship between the active and reserve components within the Marine Corps from the perspective of the funds appropriated by Congress.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research examines the history of the Marine Corps Reserve appropriations from 1960 to the post Cold War era (1990's). The thesis will address the following questions:

- * In a period of shrinking resources, how have the reserve appropriations within the Marine Corps been treated in correspondence with reductions in the active duty appropriations of the Marine Corps?
- * What has been the relationship between the Marine Corps Reserve and the active duty appropriations since 1960?
- * How has the Total Force Policy affected funding for the Marine Corps Reserve?
- * How has the Base Force concept and the Bottom-Up review affected the future of the Marine Corps Reserve?

C. DISCUSSION

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the United States finds itself as the only superpower in the world. With the Soviet threat no longer a major concern, the Department of Defense is currently in the midst of major budget reductions. With resources shifting away from the Department of Defense, a major dilemma has been the allocation of funds to active duty forces as opposed to the allocation of funds to the part-time reserves. Congress has historically supported an increase in the reserves because the reserves are a constituency and are cheaper than their active duty counterparts. Conversely, the Department of Defense has continuously proposed proportionate reductions to reserves in conjunction with the active duty forces. The Department of Defense's contention is that future threats to U.S. security would not allow enough lead time to organize, train, and deploy reservists, therefore an increased reserve force would not be as beneficial.

D. OVERVIEW

With the issue of whether or not to proportionately increase or decrease the reserves with the active component, the scope of the thesis is to analyze the funding and end strengths of both the active and reserve components of the Marine Corps since 1960.

Chapter II will give a background of the Marine Corps Reserve. This background will consist of a history of the reserves from 1916 to the 1950's and an explanation of the personnel and operation and maintenance appropriations of the Marine Corps, i.e.,

RPMC, O&MMCR, MPMC and O&MMC. Additionally, a brief explanation is provided on the tables and figures. Lastly, the various categories within the Marine Corps Reserve will be explained to provide a better understanding of the various types of reservists comprising the Marine Corps Reserve.

Chapters III through VI will analyze budget data from the above mentioned appropriations to show trends, similarities and differences. The data will be analyzed within the framework of decades, i.e., the 1960's, 1970's, 1980's, and 1990's. In conclusion, based on the data in Chapters III through VI, Chapter VII will determine the relationship between the active and reserve components of the Marine Corps and look at the future of the Marine Corps Reserve.

E. METHODOLOGY

To determine the relationship between the reserve and active duty appropriations, budget data was gathered and analyzed from a variety of sources. The Budget of the United States for fiscal years 1960 through 1994 provided vital data. The current Future Years Defense Program has provided critical information for fiscal years 1995 through 1999. The numerous studies conducted on the reserves by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), the RAND Corporation, and the Marine Corps Research Center, were critical in gaining insight into the direction of the Marine Corps Reserve in the 1990's.

F. BENEFIT

Through this research both active and reserve personnel will have a better understanding of the Marine Corps Reserve and its funding support patterns. With the data that has been gathered, the Marine Corps will have more information available when making policy decisions concerning the allocation of resources to the active and reserve components. A secondary benefit is that the data presented in this thesis is a step in alleviating the "us" v. "them" syndrome that has existed between the active and reserve establishment. Lastly, hopefully this thesis will show the significance of the Total Force Policy and also lend added support to the bridge that allows the active and reserve components of the Marine Corps to work as a team.

II. BACKGROUND

A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER

The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader an overview of the Marine Corps Reserve from its inception in 1916 through the 1950's. This chapter will give the reader a historical perspective of the reserves and set the stage for the 1960's. Also an explanation of the appropriations being analyzed will be given, along with an explanation of the tables and figures. Lastly, a brief outline of the various reserve categories is presented.

B. THE BEGINNING OF THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE

Since the inception of the Marine Corps Reserve in 1916, its mission has been to provide trained and qualified individuals and units to support the active component in time of national emergency. Its members have served valiantly in all major conflicts from World War I to Desert Storm/Shield. Their dedication and professionalism are in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps.

In April 1917, the United States declared war on Germany, at which time the Marine Corps Reserve consisted of three officers and thirty-two enlisted reservists.¹ Because the Marine Corps Reserve was still in its infant stages as an organization, direct and

¹Reserve Officers of Public Affairs Unit 4-1, The Marine Corps Reserve - A History, Division of Reserve, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1966, p. 9.

specific involvement of the Marine Corps Reserve is not clearly documented. Official records were often combined without specific distinction made to whether an individual was a regular or a reservist.² But from 1917 to the end of the war the initial reserve end strength of thirty-five (three officers, thirty-two enlisted) grew to roughly 7000.³ As the war came to an end, the reserve end strength saw a significant decrease.

C. MARINE CORPS RESERVE IN THE 1920'S AND 1930'S

The early 1920's saw the Marine Corps Reserve end strength decline even further. The Marine Corps Reserve as an organization lacked direction and found itself having to justify its existence during a time of peace.

Not until 1925 did the Marine Corps Reserve receive clear policy guidance. Robert Aquilina explains:

In February 1925, Congress passed an act to provide for the creation, organization, administration and maintenance of a Naval Reserve and a Marine Corps Reserve. This new Act put the Marine Corps Reserve on solid footing and provided many new features lacking under the abolished 1916 Act.⁴

Even though the Act of 1925 gave the Marine Corps Reserve a clear purpose and direction, lack of funding prevented reservists from participating in adequate training. With the formation of the Marine Corps Reserve Officer's Association (MCROA) in 1926, an

²Ibid., p. 9.

³Robert Aquilina, "Reserves: Over 75 Years of Readiness," Marines (Official Magazine of the U.S. Marine Corps), Vol. 20, No. 8, August 1991, p. 25.

⁴Ibid., p. 25.

organization of reservists with strong civilian ties, the reserves were able to wield their influence in Congress. The objectives of MCROA were to foster professionalism among reserve officers, promote the interests of the United States Marine Corps and to preserve the security of the United States.⁵

Despite its early problems as an organization, the reserves continued to grow. With Germany flexing its military muscle throughout Europe, the world seemed to be on the brink of war again. The Act of 1938 provided increased funding for the reserves and abolished the Act of 1925.

D. MARINE CORPS RESERVE IN WORLD WAR II

In November of 1940, President Roosevelt mobilized the Marine Corps Reserve in response to the outbreak of war in Europe. The reserves would comprise sixty-eight percent of the total Marine Corps end strength of 485,000. During the war, eighty Marines received the Medal of Honor; forty-four of these were Reservists.⁶ The Commandant of the Marine Corps during World War II, General Vandegrift, explains the role of the reserves:

During WW II, Marine Reserves constituting the bulk of the Marine Corps had a major share in its wartime achievements. Unfailingly they demonstrated that esprit de corps which is the heritage of all Marines."⁷

⁵BGen. Russell A. Bowen, "Reserve Report," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 51, No. 8, August 1967, p. 12.

⁶Aguilina, 75 Years, p. 26.

⁷Officers, A History, p. 102.

After the war, the Marine Corps Reserve continued to grow. Because of the strong legislation that had been passed during the 1920's and the 1930's, the reserves had a clear mission and Congressional support.

E. MARINE CORPS RESERVE DURING THE KOREAN WAR

Because of its clear mission, the Marine Corps Reserve found itself well prepared for the Korean War in 1950. Aquilina explains:

By late 1949, the Director of Reserve's status report showed an organization of more than 100,000 officers and men. The post-war rebuilding process had moved along well, and reflected the time, effort and money the Marine Corps was putting into the program. This investment in a trained, Ready Reserve was to pay off less than one year later.⁸

Table 2.1 shows the active and reserve end strength following World War II and prior to the Korean War.

TABLE 2.1

Marine Corps End Strength (Active and Reserve) 1945-1950

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Active Duty</u> | <u>Reserves not on Active Duty</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|--------------|
| 1945 | 469,925 | -- | 469,925 |
| 1946 | 155,679 | 22,807 | 178,732 |
| 1947 | 93,053 | 45,536 | 132,589 |
| 1948 | 84,988 | 111,122 | 196,110 |
| 1949 | 85,965 | 132,817 | 209,782 |
| 1950 | 74,279 | 128,962 | 203,118 |

Source: CNA study, 1992

The reservists proved to be extremely valuable because "...the ground forces in the entire fleet Marine Force were

⁸Aquilina, 75 Years, p. 27.

insufficient to field a 22,000 man war-strength division."⁹ The active duty Marine Corps was essentially a hollow force that was supplemented by a strong reserve force. The reserves fought with valor and honor as reflected by their thirteen Medals of Honor, fifty Navy Crosses and more than 400 Silver Stars.¹⁰ In essence, the Korean War showed how valuable a well trained reserve component can be.

Following the Korean War, the United States found itself continuously preoccupied with containing the spread of communism. With the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, the reserves received further support, and training programs were restructured to ensure the readiness of the reserves. This restructuring was to continue throughout the 1960's.

F. EXPLANATION OF MARINE CORPS APPROPRIATIONS

In order to provide the reader with a better understanding of the appropriations addressed in this thesis, the following definitions are provided:

MPMC: Military Personnel, Marine Corps

Provides funds for pay, allowances, individual clothing, interest on deposits, gratuities, permanent change of station travel (including all expenses thereof for organizational movements), and expenses of temporary duty travel between permanent duty stations, for members of the Marine Corps on active duty (except members of the Reserve provided for elsewhere).

⁹Officers, A History, p. 164.

¹⁰Aguilina, 75 Years, p. 28.

RPMC: Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps

Provides funds for pay, allowances, clothing, subsistence, gratuities, travel, and related expenses for personnel of the Marine Corps Reserve on active duty under section 265 of title 10, United States Code, or while serving on active duty under section 672(d) of title 10, United States Code, in connection with performing duty specified in section 678(a) of title 10, United States Code, or while undergoing reserve training, or while performing drills or equivalent duty, and for members of the Marine Corps platoon leaders class, and expenses authorized by section 2131 of title 10, United States Code, as authorized by law; and for payments to the Department of Military Retirement Fund.

O&MMC: Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps

O&MMCR: Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve *

These appropriations finance the costs of operating and maintaining the Marine Corps, including the Reserve component, except military personnel pay, allowances and travel costs. Included are amounts for pay of civilians, contract services for maintenance of equipment and facilities, fuel, supplies, and repair parts for weapons and equipment. Financial requirements are influenced by many factors, including the number of aircraft squadrons, divisions, installations, military strength and deployments, rates of operational activity, and the quantity and complexity of major equipment (aircraft, missiles, tank, et cetera) in operation.¹¹

* O&MMCR did not become an appropriation until 1973, operation and maintenance funding for the Reserves prior to 1973 came under O&MMC.

G. EXPLANATIONS OF TABLES AND FIGURES

All data contained in the tables, except Table 2.1 and 6.1, was compiled from the individual Budgets of the United States


¹¹Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, FY1994.

Government (also known as the President's Budget) from fiscal years 1960 to 1994. Out-year data was gathered from the fiscal year 1994 Future Years Defense Program. The graphs were directly derived from these tables and show individual and cumulative percentage increases and decreases. Dollar amounts shown represent nominal figures. Lastly, inflationary increases imply pay raises and price growth within the Department of Defense, and are not related to the national consumer price index.

H. EXPLANATION OF THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE CATEGORIES

Prior to 1967 a Marine Corps reservist was assigned to what was then called the Organized Marine Corps Reserve (OMCR). The OMCR was comprised of reservists who were required to attend drill once a month and complete two weeks of active duty training per year. The OMCR was very similar to today's Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR). Prior to 1967 there was also the Volunteer Reserve, the equivalent of today's Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). These individuals were generally prior service Marines and were not required to attend monthly drills or required to perform two weeks of annual training. Figure 2.1 shows all the categories within the Marine Corps Reserve. A brief explanation of each category is also provided. For the purpose of this thesis, only the Ready Reserve, i.e., SMCR/OMCR and the IRR/Volunteer Reserve is relevant.

FIGURE 2.1
(Marine Corps Reserve Structure)



Source: CNA Study, 1992

READY RESERVE:

SMCR (Selected Marine Corps Reserve): consists of units and individuals who participate in weekend drills and two-week annual training. The SMCR is the main source of trained units to fill out the structure in time of war.

IRR (Individual Ready Reserve): consists of individuals who have served previously in the active forces or SMCR. The IRR has two main roles: to augment the supporting establishment (bases, stations, training commands, and major headquarters), and to provide individual replacements. During an all-out war or protracted conflict, the IRR would provide a 'band-aid bridge' until additional replacements could be either recruited or drafted or trained.

RETIRED RESERVE:

Retirees: retired officers and enlisted personnel with over 30 years of service.

FMCR (Fleet Marine Corps Reserve): enlisted personnel with between 20 and 30 years of service.

STANDBY RESERVE:

other reservists liable for active duty only in limited cases, for example, certain federal employees.¹²

I. CONCLUSION:

With the Marine Corps Reserve making huge strides as an organization from 1916 to the 1950's, the reserves seemed poised for the 1960's. Chapter III explores the role of Marine Corps Reserve in the 1960's.

¹²H. Dwight Lyons, USMC Active and Reserve Force Structure and Mix Study, Vol. II: Summary, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia, 1992, p. 14 and 19.

III. MARINE CORPS RESERVE IN THE 1960's

A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER

Chapter III traces the reorganization of the Marine Corps Reserve through the 1960's and explores the funding and end strengths of the reserves relative to the regular Marine Corps.

B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The 1960's was a decade of turbulence and change in the United States. With the launching of Sputnik in 1959, the Cold War intensified. Additionally, the U-2 incident in 1960, the Berlin Wall crisis in 1961, and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, added more tension to an already bitter relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Vietnam War was also at the forefront, proving to be a continuously volatile issue. Ironically, the Marine Corps Reserve was never mobilized for the Vietnam War.

During the decade, the Marine Corps Reserve also saw drastic changes. In July 1962, the Comandant announced the reorganization of the Organized Marine Corps Reserve (OMCR). This reorganization was the birth of the Fourth Marine Division/Wing team. Colonel H.S. Wilson, Head, Personnel Management, Division of Reserve in 1967, explains that:

Prior to 1962, the Marine Corps Reserve was an assortment of drill pay units training individuals who were to be mobilized to fill vacancies in the regular Marine Corps.... In 1962 the Marine Corps Reserve was reorganized to contain the elements of

Division/Wing Teams -- to be mobilized by unit, rather than individual Marine.¹³

Three years later, another reorganization of the OMCR took place. Major C.W. Sampson of the Plan, Programs and Training Branch, Division of Reserve, Headquarters Marine Corps comments that:

In late 1965, the Commandant approved a plan to further reorganize the OMCR along the lines of the active forces. The Division/Wing team was to become a mirror image of an active Marine Expeditionary Force.¹⁴

As a result of this reorganization, in December 1967, the Organized Marine Corps Reserve (OMCR) became the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR).¹⁵ In essence, during the 1960's, the nation as well as the Marine Corps Reserve experienced major changes.

C. ANALYSIS OF DATA

Even though the Marine Corps Reserve experienced organizational changes, the end strengths remained stable throughout the 1960's. (See Table 3.1)

Prior to 1966, the end strengths for the active as well as reserve components remained relatively stable. During those years, with the exception of 1962, the end strength within RPMC varied less than two percent. In 1962, the United States found itself on the brink of war as the Kennedy administration maneuvered its way

¹³Col. H.S. Wilson, "Reserve Report," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 51, No. 7, July 1967, p. 12.

¹⁴Maj. C.W. Sampson, "Reserve Report," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 53, No. 12, December 1969, p. 45.

¹⁵H. Dwight Lyons, USMC Active and Reserve Force Structure and Mix Study, Vol. I: Summary, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia, 1992, p. 8.

TABLE 3.1
Marine Corps End Strength (Active and Reserve) 1960's

| <u>Year</u> | <u>MPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> | <u>RPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> |
|-------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1960 | 170,621 | 0% | 0% | 46,470 | 0% | 0% |
| 1961 | 176,909 | 3.69% | 3.69% | 45,975 | (1.07%) | (1.07%) |
| 1962 | 190,962 | 7.94% | 11.63% | 48,608 | 5.73% | 4.66% |
| 1963 | 189,683 | (0.67%) | 10.96% | 48,102 | (1.04%) | 3.62% |
| 1964 | 189,751 | 0.04% | 11.00% | 47,927 | (0.36%) | 3.26% |
| 1965 | 190,187 | 0.23% | 11.22% | 48,243 | 0.66% | 3.92% |
| 1966 | 261,687 | 38.00% | 48.82% | 51,256 | 6.25% | 10.16% |
| 1967 | 278,145 | 6.00% | 55.11% | 49,788 | (2.86%) | 7.30% |
| 1968 | 307,252 | 10.00% | 65.57% | 47,983 | (3.63%) | 3.67% |
| 1969 | 309,771 | 0.82% | 66.39% | 49,908 | 4.00% | 7.68% |

Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, (series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960-1969.

through the Cuban missile crisis. As expected, active component end strength rose by four and eight percent in 1961 and 1962 in response to the crisis.

From 1966 on, with the increased involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War, the end strength in the MPMC appropriation saw a significant increase. MPMC increased by thirty-eight percent in 1966, whereas the reserve end strength increased by a little more than six percent. As the war escalated, so did the active duty end strength, reaching its peak in 1969. However, the reserve end strength remained stable, varying no more than four percent during any given year. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the relative stability of the reserves and the increases experienced by the regular component as a result of the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War.

FIGURE 3.1: MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH
(% Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE





FIGURE 3.2: MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH
(% Cum Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE



Source: Derived from Table 3.1

Table 3.2 shows the dollars associated with these appropriations. Again, prior to 1966 the funds associated with the MPMC and RPMC appropriations were relatively stable, with the exception of 1962. Both MPMC and RPMC in 1962 and 1964 show approximately six and ten percent increases in funding. These increases can be attributed to the increase in end strength as a result of the Cuban missile crisis and the escalating activity in Vietnam. In 1966, with increased U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the funding allocated to both appropriations experienced increases.

TABLE 3.2

Marine Corps Personnel Funding (Active and Reserve) 1960's (\$000)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>MPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> | <u>RPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> |
|-------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1960 | 597,962 | 0% | 0% | 24,066 | 0% | 0% |
| 1961 | 602,063 | 0.69% | 0.69% | 24,385 | 1.33% | 1.33% |
| 1962 | 639,330 | 5.83% | 6.88% | 25,994 | 6.60% | 7.92% |
| 1963 | 664,740 | 3.97% | 10.85% | 26,662 | 2.57% | 10.49% |
| 1964 | 725,424 | 9.13% | 19.98% | 29,497 | 10.63% | 21.13% |
| 1965 | 753,392 | 3.86% | 23.83% | 30,899 | 4.75% | 25.88% |
| 1966 | 978,247 | 29.85% | 53.68% | 36,133 | 16.94% | 42.82% |
| 1967 | 1,250,378 | 27.89% | 81.50% | 36,933 | 2.21% | 45.03% |
| 1968 | 1,430,689 | 14.42% | 95.92% | 35,875 | (2.86%) | 42.17% |
| 1969 | 1,627,084 | 6.02% | 103.19% | 36,357 | 1.34% | 43.51% |

Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, (series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960-1969.

The dollar increases occurred mainly in the MPMC appropriation, with RPMC appropriation seeing a noticeable increase only in 1966. Dollars after 1966 for the RPMC appropriation remained stable, whereas the the MPMC appropriation experienced continuous increases after 1966. (See Figure 3.3 and 3.4)

FIGURE 3.3: MARINE CORPS FUNDING
(% Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE





FIGURE 3.4: MARINE CORPS FUNDING
(% Cum. Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE



Source: Derived from Table 3.2

On the Operation and Maintenance side, a similar pattern unfolds during the 1960's. (See Table 3.3) Prior to 1966, active O&M funding experienced increases, but solely as a result of inflation. O&M funding for reserve training decreased by eight percent in 1961 but regained most of the decrease the following year with a seven percent increase in funding. O&M reserve funding from 1960 to 1965 remained stable. In 1966 the O&MMC appropriation experienced a 73 percent increase, whereas the O&M funding for reserve training only increased by seven percent.

In summary, the active component experienced significant increases in funding for O&M as a result of increased involvement in the Vietnam War. That trend continued until 1969, after which funding declined. (See Figures 3.5 and 3.6) On the reserve side,

TABLE 3.3

Marine Corps Operations and Maintenance (Active and Reserve) 1960's
(\$000)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>O&MMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> | <u>O&MMCR</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> |
|-------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1960 | 165,041 | 0% | 0% | 4,647 | 0% | 0% |
| 1961 | 171,161 | 3.71% | 3.71% | 4,262 | (8.28%) | (8.28%) |
| 1962 | 181,093 | 5.80% | 9.51% | 4,565 | 7.11% | (1.18%) |
| 1963 | 182,592 | 0.83% | 10.34% | 4,550 | (0.33%) | (1.50%) |
| 1964 | 185,088 | 1.33% | 11.71% | 4,802 | 5.54% | 4.03% |
| 1965 | 189,225 | 2.24% | 13.94% | 4,769 | (0.69%) | 3.35% |
| 1966 | 327,479 | 73.06% | 87.00% | 5,097 | 6.88% | 10.22% |
| 1967 | 423,298 | 29.26% | 116.26% | 5,856 | 14.89% | 25.12% |
| 1968 | 427,322 | 0.95% | 117.21% | 6,637 | 13.34% | 38.45% |
| 1969 | 452,751 | 5.95% | 123.17% | 5,999 | (9.61%) | 28.84% |

Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, (series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960-1969.

FIGURE 3.5: OPERATION & MAINTENANCE
(% Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE





FIGURE 3.6: OPERATION & MAINTENANCE
(% Cum Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE



Source: Derived from Table 3.3

the O&M funding remained relatively stable, with the exception of 1967 and 1968, which can be attributed to increased funding for maintenance of reserve facilities. BGen. J.L. Stewart, Director, Marine Corps Reserve in 1965 explains:

There are 46 more new structures planned during the next five years. We have been able to obtain one and half million dollars a year for new construction. We must make every dollar count since improvements and such essential items as larger storage areas must be funded from this total. By careful management we have been able to build about four or centers annually.¹⁶

D. CONCLUSION

Considering the role/mission of the Marine Corps Reserve during the 1960's, the end strengths and the corresponding dollars paint a very clear picture. Because of the reorganization of the Marine Corps Reserve and its lack of involvement in Vietnam, the funding and end strengths remained relatively stable, with slight increases occurring from 1966-1968. Because of the limited involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War, the Marine Corps Reserve was not mobilized as was the case in World War II and the Korean War. Therefore the 1960's show the Marine Corps Reserve appropriations remaining relatively stable, whereas the active component appropriations experienced significant increases.

¹⁶BGen. J.L. Stewart, "Reserve Report," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 49, No. 9, September 1965, p. 10.

IV. MARINE CORPS RESERVE IN THE 1970's

A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER

Chapter IV explores the Marine Corps Reserve in the 1970's. Of particular concern is the post Vietnam era, the origin/implementation of the Total Force Policy and the turbulence in end strength and funding experienced by the Marine Corps Reserve during the 1970's.

B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

If the 1960's can be described as a decade of social unrest and change, the 1970's can be described as the decade in which the United States recuperates and grows accustomed to changes that occurred during the 1960's. The Vietnam war was the impetus for a lot of the growing pains the United States experienced in the 1970's. The Nixon Administration came into office on the promise that it would end the war and bring peace back to the United States. Because the war had been so unpopular, we saw the draft give way to an All-Volunteer Force and military end strength and funding take considerable reductions.

Aside from the social ramifications resulting from the Vietnam War, economic concerns also prevailed. The high cost of waging war in Vietnam and the effects of the Johnson Administration's war on poverty were starting to affect the economy. Also as a result of the OPEC oil embargo, the United States for the first time experienced inflation and unemployment simultaneously, i.e., stagflation. But probably

the most significant policy/concept to affect the military in the 1970's was the Total Force concept.

The Total Force concept was established by then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in August 1970. The thrust behind this concept was to find more efficient ways of allocating scarce resources within the Department of Defense. One way to reduce costs and still maintain a sizeable military force, was to put more emphasis on the reserves. The memorandum originally drafted by Secretary Laird emphasized the following:

Within the Department of Defense, these economies will require reductions in overall strengths and capabilities of the active forces, and increased reliance on the combat support units of the Guard and Reserves.... Emphasis will be given to current considerations of the total forces, active and reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support national strategy and meet the threat. A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing the Guard and Reserve force.¹⁷

The Laird memorandum attempted to show Congress that the Department of Defense intended to cut the Pentagon Budget. By emphasizing the less expensive reserve forces over the active duty forces, a clear message was being given that cost reduction measures were about to be implemented.

Even though the Total Force Concept was initially born in 1970, it did not become official policy until 1973 under then Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. Schlesinger stated that:

...the Total Force is no longer a 'concept'. It is now the Total Force Policy which integrates the Active, Guard and Reserve forces into a homogenous whole.... It must be clearly

¹⁷Patrick M. Cronin, The Total Force Policy in Historical Perspective, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia, 1987, p. 6.

understood that implicit in the Total Force Policy, as emphasized by Presidential and National Security Council documents, the Congress and Secretary of Defense policy, is the fact that the Guard and Reserve forces will be used as the initial and primary augmentation of the active forces.¹⁸

C. ANALYSIS OF DATA

Ironically, even though the Total Force went from a concept to official policy, the Marine Corps Reserve continued to decline. Correspondingly, active duty end strength experienced significant decreases between 1970 and 1974. (See Table 4.1)

TABLE 4.1
Marine Corps End Strength (Active and Reserve) 1970's

| <u>Year</u> | <u>MPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> | <u>RPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> |
|-------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1970 | 259,737 | 0% | 0% | 48,575 | 0% | 0% |
| 1971 | 212,369 | (18.24%) | (18.24%) | 47,761 | (1.68%) | (1.68%) |
| 1972 | 198,238 | (6.65%) | (24.89%) | 41,484 | (13.14%) | (14.82%) |
| 1973 | 196,098 | (1.08%) | (25.97%) | 38,196 | (7.93%) | (22.74%) |
| 1974 | 188,802 | (3.72%) | (29.69%) | 31,896 | (16.49%) | (39.24%) |
| 1975 | 195,951 | 3.79% | (25.90%) | 33,089 | 3.74% | (35.50%) |
| 1976 | 192,336 | (1.84%) | (27.75%) | 26,849 | (18.86%) | (54.36%) |
| 1977 | 191,641 | (0.36%) | (28.11%) | 31,687 | 18.02% | (36.34%) |
| 1978 | 190,755 | (0.46%) | (28.57%) | 33,403 | 5.42% | (30.92%) |
| 1979 | 185,187 | (2.92%) | (31.49%) | 34,280 | 2.63% | (28.30%) |


Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, (series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970-1979.

Obviously with the United States pulling out of Vietnam, the active Marine Corps saw its end strength decrease, especially in 1971, when it experienced an eighteen percent decrease. Between 1970 and 1974, the Marine Corps Reserve end strength reductions, with the exception of 1971, were greater than the active duty reductions.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 9.

A possible explanation would be that a lot of individuals looking for ways to avoid serving in Vietnam used the reserves as a haven for avoiding service in Vietnam. As the Vietnam war ended, there was an exodus from the reserves. Additionally, with the All-Volunteer-Force becoming a reality in 1973 and a lot of anti-military sentiment existing because of the war, the military found it hard to attract individuals to its ranks. Lastly, even though the Total Force Policy was enacted, in practice the Pentagon had shown little effort in augmenting its reserve forces. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the end strength decreases experienced by the Marine Corps (active and reserve) between 1970 and 1974. It becomes quite obvious that the Total Force Policy remained essentially hollow in the early 1970's, and a strong emphasis was not put on the reserves until the late 1970's.


FIGURE 4.1: MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH
(% Change)



Source: Derived from Table 4.1

□ MPMC + RPMC

FIGURE 4.2: MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH
(%Cum Change)



Source: Derived from Table 4.1

□ MPMC + RPMC

Another reason for the Total Force Policy remaining essentially hollow in the early 1970's, was that Pentagon officials believed in a defense strategy which was geared toward a nuclear war. A nuclear war would for all intent and purposes be quick and would not allow for the mobilization of reserve forces. Not until the late 1970's, after realizing that the Soviets had reached nuclear parity with the United States, and the event of a nuclear war would destroy both sides, did the strategy change from one of a nuclear confrontation to a conventional one. In the minds of military planners, a conventional war between the United States and Soviet Union would be a long drawn out affair most likely fought on European soil. Such a scenario would definitely favor the deployment/mobilization of reserve forces because enough time would be available to mobilize and train reservists.

The data in Table 4.1 and Figures 4.1 and 4.2 reflect this change in strategy. In the late 1970's, one sees a steady increase in the Marine Corps Reserve ranging from three to eighteen percent. On the active duty side, end strength remained relatively stable, experiencing minimal decreases ranging from zero to three percent.

The Department of Defense's inconsistent actions concerning the reserves during the 1970's is very evident in the funding for the Marine Corps Reserve, i.e., personnel and operation and maintenance. Table 4.2 shows RPMC funding increasing every year except in 1974. Fiscal years 1973 to 1974 show erratic funding

TABLE 4.2

Marine Corps Personnel Funding (Active and Reserve) 1970's
(\$000)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>MPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> | <u>RPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> |
|-------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1970 | 1,627,084 | 0% | 0% | 48,847 | 0% | 0% |
| 1971 | 1,461,640 | (10.17%) | (10.17%) | 53,672 | 9.88% | 9.88% |
| 1972 | 1,455,792 | (0.40%) | (10.57%) | 58,144 | 8.33% | 18.21% |
| 1973 | 1,577,722 | 8.38% | (2.19%) | 68,375 | 17.60% | 35.81% |
| 1974 | 1,660,636 | 5.26% | 3.06% | 60,490 | (11.53%) | 24.27% |
| 1975 | 1,745,766 | 5.17% | 8.19% | 65,122 | 7.66% | 31.93% |
| 1976 | 1,851,277 | 6.04% | 14.23% | 70,967 | 8.98% | 40.91% |
| 1977 | 1,900,124 | 2.64% | 16.87% | 73,697 | 4.23% | 45.13% |
| 1978 | 2,013,704 | 5.98% | 22.85% | 82,196 | 11.13% | 56.26% |
| 1979 | 2,098,462 | 4.21% | 27.06% | 83,903 | 2.08% | 58.34% |

Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, (series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970-1979.

in which funding increased by eighteen percent and decreased by twelve percent the following year. The 1973 increase was a result of increased emphasis on training and support, whereas the 1974 decrease reflected the sixteen percent decrease in end strength.

From 1975 to 1979 funding was consistently increased by as little as two percent to as much as eleven percent.

The MPMC appropriation remained very consistent during the 1970's. Aside from the draw-down as a result of the Vietnam war, 1970-1972, the MPMC appropriation remained very stable from 1973 to 1979. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show MPMC and RPMC funding.

The Operation and Maintenance appropriation for the reserves shows the same irregularity. From 1970 to 1975 we see sharp increases interrupted by decreases. Not until the late seventies do we see significant, continuous increases in the Operations and Maintenance funding for the reserves. (See Table 4.3)

TABLE 4.3

Marine Corps Operations and Maintenance (Active and Reserve) 1970's
(\$000)

| Year | O&MMC | % Change | % Cum Change | O&MMCR | % Change | % Cum Change |
|------|---------|----------|--------------|--------|----------|--------------|
| 1970 | 400,219 | 0% | 0% | 6,395 | 0% | 0% |
| 1971 | 394,727 | (1.37%) | (1.37%) | 8,601 | 34.50% | 34.50% |
| 1972 | 353,191 | (10.52%) | (9.64%) | 8,094 | (5.89%) | 28.60% |
| 1973 | 383,139 | 8.48% | 3.83% | 7,945 | (1.84%) | 26.76% |
| 1974 | 441,540 | 15.24% | 11.41% | 12,094 | 52.22% | 78.98% |
| 1975 | 458,869 | 3.92% | 15.34% | 11,611 | (3.99%) | 74.99% |
| 1976 | 512,203 | 11.62% | 26.96% | 11,739 | 1.10% | 76.09% |
| 1977 | 591,313 | 15.45% | 42.41% | 15,008 | 27.85% | 103.94% |
| 1978 | 657,517 | 11.20% | 53.60% | 16,257 | 8.32% | 112.26% |
| 1979 | 745,082 | 13.32% | 60.62% | 19,660 | 20.93% | 133.19% |

Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, (series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970-1979.

Operation and Maintenance funding for the active force, again aside from the Vietnam draw-down, remained very consistent during the 1970's. (See Figures 4.5 and 4.6)

FIGURE 4.3: MARINE CORPS FUNDING
(% Change)





FIGURE 4.4: MARINE CORPS FUNDING
(% Cum Change)



Source: Derived from Table 4.2

FIGURE 4.5: OPERATION & MAINTENANCE
(% Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE





FIGURE 4.6: OPERATION & MAINTENANCE
(% Cum. Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE



Source: Derived from Table 4.3

D. CONCLUSION

The 1970's proved to be a decade in which the Marine Corps Reserve found itself in a state of flux. Although the Total Force Concept/Policy put more emphasis on the reserves, largely because of the prevailing military strategy, the reserves never really received the increases in end strength and funding as envisioned by the Total Force Policy. Not until the mid to late 1970's, in which a conventional war scenario became a reality, did the reserves receive the attention that had been espoused by the Total Force Policy of the 1973. That increased emphasis on the reserves would continue through the 1980's.

V. MARINE CORPS RESERVE IN THE 1980's

A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the Marine Corps Reserve during the 1980's. This chapter will emphasize the implementation of the Total Force Policy under the Reagan Administration and the budget constraints experienced by military planners because of increasing budget deficits.

B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Ever since the United States military strategy changed in the mid-1970's from a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union to a conventional scenario, the Total Force Policy became more than just a formulated strategy, it became reality. In the late 1970's the Marine Corps Reserve started to expand, but not until the Reagan Administration took office in 1981, was the Total Force Policy fully implemented.

Ronald Reagan came into office promising to make America strong again. The logic behind the strategy was that a strong America would be much more adept at dealing with the containment of communism than a weak one. With the Soviet Union flexing its military muscle in Afghanistan, United States policy makers had plenty to be concerned about. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were so soured that the United States boycotted the 1980 Olympics. As Ronald Reagan took office, one of his main objectives was to increase military spending using the Total Force Policy as a guide.

Although the Total Force Policy was only paid lip-service during the 1970's, Ronald Reagan knew that he could out-spend the Soviets militarily. The Soviet Union, a superpower in her own right, was economically a third world country. Forcing the Soviets to direct an increasing share of their GNP to defense would eventually derail their economy. Therefore the United States could increase its military spending, retain its economic heavyweight status, and maintain pressure on the Soviets.

The Secretary of the Navy for Ronald Reagan was John Lehman. Secretary Lehman was intent on restoring the Navy to a 600 ship Navy. As early as 1975, RADM Staser Holcomb testified before Congress on the decline of the U.S. Navy:

By capitalizing on the large inventory of ships built during WW II, the Congress was able to maintain an active fleet of 800 to 900 ships... peaking at 976 in 1968.... During the past 10 years, an average of 19 new ships has been authorized for construction each year... procurement sufficient to maintain an active fleet of about 510 ships, under steady state conditions and nominal ship life assumptions. Today, most of our World War II ships have been retired and we have, in fact, a 500-ship active fleet.¹⁹

RADM Holcomb envisioned a 600-ship Navy by the mid-1980's.²⁰ In essence, Secretary Lehman used the 600 ship mark as a guide to rebuild a Navy that had been neglected throughout the 1970's.

This emphasis on making America strong again also affected the Marine Corps. As with the Navy, the 1970's had been a difficult decade for the Marine Corps and the 1980's would prove to be a

¹⁹Cronin, Total Force, p. 38.

²⁰Ibid., p. 38.

rebuilding period. Robert J. Murray, former Under Secretary of the Navy explains:

The atmosphere in the 1980's is certainly better than the atmosphere was in the 1970's. The American people now see that the Navy's mission and the Marine Corps' mission are important, that American responsibility around the world is still going to continue in the 1980's, that the Navy and the Marine Corps are the services that have to cover the bulk of those global responsibilities, and that we cannot put armies and air forces on other people's territory except in very special cases like Germany, Korea, and the United Kingdom....²¹

With an emphasis on increasing Naval and Marine Corps forces, the Total Force Policy would require policy makers to also put an emphasis on the reserves. Since John Lehman was a reserve naval aviator himself, the Total Force Policy was definitely allowed to flourish and the reserve components of both the Navy and Marine Corps saw personnel as well as funding increases during the 1980's.

The mere fact that Secretary Lehman was a reservist was not the only reason for an increased emphasis on the reserves. The main reason for the resurgence of the reserves in the Navy and Marine Corps was because they were cheaper. Even though the Reagan Administration wanted to increase the military both in equipment and manpower, Congress was hesitant about this escalation because of increasing manpower costs. One way to reduce manpower costs was to follow the original intent of the Total Force Policy and put more emphasis on the reserves. The policy as well as the reserves came in handy since military strategists had envisioned a conventional war scenario in which enough response time was available to mobilize and deploy reservists. Also, as evidenced by

²¹Cronin, Total Force, p. 39.

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings I and II, during the 1980's, Congress was increasingly becoming worried about the growing budget deficit.

As the Total Force Policy was implemented, the roles and missions of the Marine Corps Reserve were again redefined. The following provides the thrust of the roles and missions of the Marine Corps Reserve during the early 1980's:

The mission of the Reserve is to provide additional capability and depth for sustained operations during lengthy deployments or protracted combat.

- * Augmentation, which is filling existing structure. For example, a reserve rifle company may be called to fill an active infantry battalion.
- * Reinforcement, which is adding capabilities to active Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTF's). For example, a MAGTF may be reinforced by a reserve artillery battalion.
- * Reconstitution (formerly called force expansion), which is providing additional forces. It should be noted that existing reserve units expect to fill the augmentation and reinforcement roles. Reconstitution would likely involve building additional reserve units around nondeployed SMCR command structure (e.g., division headquarters).²²

As a result, the Marine Corps Reserve was structured along the same lines as the active component to reflect a "mirror image." In theory, the Marine Corps Reserve should be able to perform the same functions as the active component.

Although the United States found itself involved in relatively small military conflicts during the 1980's, i.e., Grenada, the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut, the bombing of Libya, the Marine Corps Reserve was again relegated to the role of having

²²Lyons, Reserve Mix Study, Vol. II, p. 9-10.

to wait. The benefits of the build-up of the Marine Corps Reserve would not be realized until the next decade in Desert Storm/Shield.

C. ANALYSIS OF DATA

The early 1980's saw a tremendous build-up of the United States armed forces, whereas the late 1980's show small incremental decreases in both personnel and funding.

The Marine Corps end strength, active and reserve, reflect this scenario. The active component remained very stable throughout the 1980's. MPMC experienced steady one percent end strength increases from 1980-1987. From 1988-1989, the MPMC end strength decreased by no more than one percent. In essence, the active component shows a very steady increase in end strength throughout the 1980's, marked by minimal decreases in 1988 and 1989. This is very much in line with the policies of the administrations that were in office during the 1980's. The Reagan administration increased military end strength and funding, whereas the Bush administration in the late 1980's started decreasing military expenditures.

The Marine Corps Reserve reflects a similar scenario, but is definitely not as stable as the active component. As expected with the implementation of the Total Force Policy under the Reagan Administration in 1981, the reserves saw significant increases in end strength during the early 1980's. In 1982 and 1983, end strength increased by nine percent and six percent respectively. The six percent increase in 1983 was subsequently offset by a five

percent decrease the following year, 1984. From the 1985 to 1989, reserve end strength either remained the same or increased.

In summary, the end strength for the Marine Corps Reserve during the 1980's can be described in three phases; build-up, transition period, build-up. The early 1980's show a build-up of reserve end strength, whereas the mid-1980's shows a transition period which is marked by small increases and decreases. The late 1980's show the Marine Corps Reserve growing again.

Even though the active component end strengths are much more stable, one can definitely see that an emphasis had been put on the reserves. Table 5.1 and Figures 5.1 and 5.2 paint an even clearer picture.

TABLE 5.1
Marine Corps End Strength (Active and Reserve) 1980's

| <u>Year</u> | <u>MPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> | <u>RPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> |
|-------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1980 | 188,469 | 0% | 0% | 37,038 | 0% | 0% |
| 1981 | 190,620 | 1.14% | 1.14% | 37,049 | 0.03% | 0.03% |
| 1982 | 192,059 | 0.75% | 1.90% | 40,461 | 9.21% | 9.24% |
| 1983 | 194,089 | 1.07% | 2.95% | 38,196 | 5.51% | 14.75% |
| 1984 | 196,189 | 1.08% | 4.04% | 31,896 | (4.85%) | 9.90% |
| 1985 | 198,025 | 0.94% | 4.97% | 33,089 | 2.38% | 12.28% |
| 1986 | 198,814 | 0.40% | 5.37% | 26,849 | (0.01%) | 12.27% |
| 1987 | 199,527 | 0.36% | 5.73% | 31,687 | 1.61% | 13.88% |
| 1988 | 197,350 | (1.09%) | 4.64% | 33,403 | 3.08% | 16.97% |
| 1989 | 195,558 | (0.91%) | 3.73% | 34,280 | 0.05% | 17.01% |

Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, (series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980-1989.

FIGURE 5.1: MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH
(% Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE





FIGURE 5.2: MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH
(%Gum Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE



Source: Derived from Table 5.1

Funding associated with these end strengths show a similar pattern, but not the same. The early 1980's (1981-1983) show increased funding for both the actives and the reserves. Even though MPMC experienced increases in 1981 and 1982, RPMC received even bigger percentage increases. In 1981 and 1982, the RPMC appropriation increased by twenty-four percent and twenty-seven percent respectively. One can definitely see that the Reagan administration was keeping its promise of increased funding for the military in the early 1980's.

The rest of the decade remained stable, except for 1985. In 1985 MPMC experienced a forty-one percent increase and RPMC an fifty-seven percent increase. The reason for these tremendous increases was the establishment of accrual accounting for the military retirement system.²³ In essence, the retired pay for the Marine Corps was now included in the MPMC and RPMC appropriations. If the change in the allocation of retired pay had not occurred, funding increases for both appropriations after 1984 would have remained very steady. Between 1984 and 1989, excluding 1985, MPMC basically experienced inflationary increases. For RPMC the same logic applies, with the exception of 1987, where RPMC experiences a slight decrease of two percent. (See Table 5.2 and Figures 5.3 and 5.4)


²³United States Marine Corps, Reserve Personnel Marine Corps Budget, Fiscal Year 1985, Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 26.

TABLE 5.2
Marine Corps Personnel Funding (Active and Reserve) 1980's
(\$000)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>MPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> | <u>RPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> |
|-------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1980 | 2,235,310 | 0% | 0% | 96,090 | 0% | 0% |
| 1981 | 2,666,610 | 19.29% | 19.29% | 118,955 | 23.80% | 23.80% |
| 1982 | 3,111,829 | 16.70% | 35.99% | 151,281 | 27.17% | 50.97% |
| 1983 | 3,347,565 | 7.58% | 43.57% | 169,889 | 12.30% | 63.27% |
| 1984 | 3,516,338 | 5.04% | 48.61% | 172,248 | 1.39% | 64.66% |
| 1985 | 4,952,473 | 40.84% | 89.45% | 269,930 | 56.71% | 121.37% |
| 1986 | 5,161,083 | 4.21% | 93.66% | 283,045 | 4.86% | 126.23% |
| 1987 | 5,438,786 | 5.38% | 99.04% | 277,316 | (2.02%) | 124.20% |
| 1988 | 5,562,912 | 2.28% | 101.33% | 294,200 | 6.09% | 130.29% |
| 1989 | 5,678,983 | 2.09% | 103.41% | 314,980 | 7.06% | 137.36% |

Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, (series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980-1989.


**FIGURE 5.3: MARINE CORPS FUNDING
(% Change)**



Source: Derived from Table 5.2

□ MPMC + RPMC

FIGURE 5.4: MARINE CORPS FUNDING
(% Cum Change)



Source: Derived from Table 5.2

□ MPMC + RPMC

Summing up the 1980's for personnel funding, with the exception of 1985, funding increased in the early 1980's as a result of the Reagan build-up. After 1985, both appropriations experienced minimal increases and decreases.

Operation and Maintenance for both the active and reserve component followed a very similar path during the 1980's. Again the early 1980's show significant increases in both appropriations. O&MMCR received thirty-five, thirty-nine, and twenty-seven percent increases from 1981 to 1983 respectively. O&MMC received similar increases in funding but not as dramatic as O&MMCR. After 1984 we see both appropriations following a similar pattern marked by increases and decreases. In 1986 O&MMC was cut five percent and O&MMCR took a corresponding seven percent decrease. These reductions were most likely in response to the

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation on deficit reduction. The following year, 1987, both appropriations experienced sizeable increases, seventeen percent for O&MMC and eighteen percent for O&MMCR, to regain the losses incurred the previous year. Again, Table 5.3 shows the raw data and percentage increases and decreases. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show how both appropriations followed almost the same path during the 1980's.

TABLE 5.3

Marine Corps Operations and Maintenance (Active and Reserve) 1980's
(\$000)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>O&MMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> | <u>O&MMCR</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> |
|-------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1980 | 880,167 | 0% | 0% | 21,155 | 0% | 0% |
| 1981 | 1,089,839 | 23.82% | 23.82% | 28,594 | 35.16% | 35.16% |
| 1982 | 1,181,103 | 8.37% | 32.20% | 39,762 | 39.06% | 74.22% |
| 1983 | 1,479,412 | 25.26% | 57.45% | 50,453 | 26.89% | 101.11% |
| 1984 | 1,559,971 | 5.45% | 62.90% | 52,111 | 3.29% | 104.40% |
| 1985 | 1,657,778 | 6.27% | 69.17% | 58,669 | 12.58% | 116.98% |
| 1986 | 1,575,629 | (4.93%) | 64.21% | 54,357 | (7.35%) | 109.63% |
| 1987 | 1,841,427 | 16.87% | 81.08% | 63,978 | 17.70% | 127.33% |
| 1988 | 1,800,488 | (2.22%) | 78.86% | 69,500 | 8.63% | 135.96% |
| 1989 | 1,839,947 | 2.19% | 81.05% | 77,417 | 11.39% | 147.35% |

Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, (series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980-1989.

D. CONCLUSION

The 1980's can be described as a decade in which the military saw a resurgence. President Reagan's campaign promise to make America strong again resulted in the increased funneling of resources to the military. The Marine Corps, active and reserve component, both benefited from the increased emphasis on the military. The big difference in this build-up was that this time

FIGURE 5.5: OPERATION & MAINTENANCE

(% Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE





FIGURE 5.6: OPERATION & MAINTENANCE

(% Cum Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE



Source: Derived from Table 5.3

the reserves were included. End Strength and the corresponding funding for personnel and operations and maintenance show significant increases during the early 1980's. Without question, the Total Force Policy was very instrumental in guiding this build-up. After 1984, end strengths and funding drop off significantly. With the national deficit becoming much more of an issue during the later part of the 1980's, fiscal conservatives sought to put more emphasis on reducing the deficit. Also, with the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev, and his policies of Glasnost and Perestroika, the once ominous threat from the Soviet Union seemed to be waning. This change in the threat and the decline of the Warsaw Pact powers would prove significant for the 1990's.

VI. MARINE CORPS RESERVE IN THE 1990's

A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the role of the Marine Corps Reserve in the post Cold War era. Addressed will be the Base Force concept implemented under the Bush Administration, as well as the Bottom-Up review proposed by the Clinton Administration. Also, a brief explanation of the Marine Corps Reserve's involvement in Desert Storm/Shield will be given. The analysis of the budget data will show actual data through fiscal year 1993, and data from fiscal years 1994 to 1999 are projected end strengths and funding from the latest Future Years Defense Program.

B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The threat of communism was the impetus for American foreign policy for forty years. In this era, ethnic, national, religious and economic conflicts, whether in the Persian Gulf, the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia or Somalia, dominated the scene. Since the late 1980's, the world has changed from a bipolar world to a multipolar world with a lot more complexity.

The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union has left the United States as the only superpower in the world. This new status has resulted in the United States having to rethink and reshape its military forces to handle the post Cold War threats.

The collapse of the Soviet Union came in two phases. The first phase began when Mikhail Gorbachev announced to the United

Nations in December 1988, that he would withdraw Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and reduce Soviet forces. That phase ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, signaling the end of the Warsaw Pact and also the end of the Soviet Union's domination of Eastern Europe.

This turn of events resulted in the United States scaling back its forces in light of the reduced threat from the Soviet Union. This reduction came in the form of the Base Force concept, introduced by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and announced by President Bush in August of 1990. The purpose of the Base Force concept was to reduce the United States military by twenty-five percent from 1990 to 1995. The Base Force was basically a downsized force shaped largely by Cold War priorities.

The second phase of the collapse of the Soviet Union came in the summer of 1991, when hardliners attempted to overthrow Mikhail Gorbachev to halt the social and economic changes sweeping the Soviet Union. This attempt not only failed, but accelerated change within the Soviet Union and ultimately led to the formation of the new Commonwealth of Independent States and the emergence of Boris Yeltsin.

This change in the world has significantly impacted the Marine Corps. Marine Corps active end strength was projected to decrease from 196,652 in fiscal year 1990 to 158,800 in fiscal year 1997.

The reserves were to take a similar reduction in end strength from 44,530 in fiscal year 1990 to 34,900 in fiscal year 1997.²⁴

Ironically on the day President Bush announced the Base Force concept, Iraq invaded Kuwait. As a result, some thought the Base Force concept was premature because Saddam Hussein had shown that the world was still a dangerous place. Others, because of the quick and decisive victory of the United States and the coalition forces in the war that followed, wanted to reduce the Base Force even more.

Nevertheless, the liberation of Kuwait by the coalition forces provided an opportunity for the reserves from all the services of the United States to employ their skills and training. Operation Desert Storm/Shield for first time since the Korean war saw the Marine Corps Reserve mobilized. Although the Marine Corps was authorized to call up the reserve component, there was a delay.

H. Dwight Lyons explains:

Although authorized to do so, the Marines did not immediately start calling up reserves. On 23 August, the Commandant issued a message stating, in effect, that active forces would be used for the first 60 days of the contingency, but reserve units should 'stand by' to be called up after that time. There has been some discussion of whether it was Marine Corps 'policy' not to call reserves for the first 60 days. A review of mobilization policy failed to produce any references to a 60-day policy. We believe the Commandant was proving a point -- that Marines, as a 'force in readiness,' could respond to regional contingencies for the first 60 days without reserve support.²⁵

²⁴National Defense Research Institute, Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense, RAND MDA903-90-C-0004, 1992, p. 8.

²⁵Lyons, Reserve Mix Study, Vol. II, p. 20.

Additionally, Marygail Brauner, Harry Thie, and Roger Brown, in a RAND study titled, Assessing the Structure Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Effectiveness of Total Force Policy During the Persian Gulf Conflict, observed the following:

Marine Corps policy during Operation Desert Storm/Shield was that no reserve units would be used for the first 60 days. The active-duty Marines, in theory, should be able to initially respond to any contingency. Furthermore, USMCR personnel were to be activated only when the active component had been fully committed. By November 6, the Washington Times was reporting that the Marine Corps would be activating reservists for combat missions. It was evident that the combat units of the active-duty Marines were extended worldwide as much as possible and that they would need augmentation from the reserves.²⁶

Once called to active duty, the reserves did an outstanding job. Their achievements in Operation Desert Storm/Shield are documented by LtCol. Mark F. Cancian, who in Marine Corps Reserve Forces in Southwest Asia explains:

An active duty commander summed it up, 'When the dust settles, the performance of Marine Corps reserves in Desert Shield and Desert Storm will have to be considered a very, very big success. We were able to take reserve combat units, combat support units and combat service support units, mobilize them, deploy them and employ them in a war and they did fine.' The basic structures, policies and for Marine Corps reserve forces are, therefore, sound.²⁷ [sic]

In essence, for the first time the Total Force Policy was put to the test, and the planning and expenditures devoted to the building of the integrated network between active and reserve forces proved

²⁶Marygail Brauner, Harry Thie, and Roger Brown, Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Effectiveness of Total Force Policy During the Persian Gulf War, RAND, MR-132-OSD, 1992, p. 40.

²⁷LtCol. Mark F. Cancian, Marine Corps Reserve Forces in Southwest Asia, Marine Corps Research Center, Research Paper 92-0015, July 1991, p. 9.

to be worthwhile. But the rest of the 1990's will probably show a shift away from employment of reserve forces.

As mentioned earlier, under the Bush Administration, the Base Force concept showed drastic reductions in Marine Corps end strength and funding. Under the Clinton Adminstration, the Base Force concept has given way to the Bottom-Up review.

As the Clinton Administration came into office in January of 1993, with the motto that it was time for "change" in America, the Department of Defense also experienced change. With volatile issues such as women in combat, homosexuals in the military, and the "tailhook" affair, which brought the issue of sexual harassment to the forefront, the Department of Defense and the administration found themselves with plenty to be concerned with.

Another result of this "change" sweeping America was that Department of Defense planners were again reevaluating the national security threat and the forces necessary to protect against this threat. The result of this reevaluation was the Bottom-Up review.

Robert Williams writes the following about the Bottom-Up review:

Defense Secretary Les Aspin and Army General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the review proposes a total uniformed force of 1.4 million by 1999, which is about 200,000 troops less than was recommended by the Bush administration. While detailed costs and savings were not specified in the Bottom-Up review, it is believed that Defense Department spending would drop nearly \$130 billion below the estimate put forth by the Bush administration through Fiscal Year 1998.... The package of proposals envisions a largely U.S. - based force of sufficient size to handle two major

regional conflicts at the same time. Mentioned as possible battle sites for the 1990's are the Middle East and Korea.²⁸

Actually the Marine Corps fared rather well in the Bottom-Up review. Table 6.1 shows the differences. Because the Marine

TABLE 6.1
Marine Corps Projected End Strength
(Active and Reserve)

| | <u>Base Force Concept</u> <u>FY1997</u> | <u>Bottom-Up Review</u> <u>FY1997</u> | <u>Change</u> |
|---------|--|--|---------------|
| Active | 158,800 | 174,000 | +14,200 |
| Reserve | 34,900 | 42,000 | +7,100 |

Sources: National Defense Research Institute Study, Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense, and Bottom-Up review

Corps benefited from the Bottom-Up review, the reductions required to achieve a force size of 1.4 million by fiscal year 1999 came from the Army and the Air Force.

C. ANALYSIS OF DATA

Marine Corps end strength and funding data for the 1990's are straight forward. As envisioned by the Base Force concept, active duty end strength saw gradual decreases from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1993. From fiscal year 1994 to fiscal year 1999, as per the Bottom-Up review, we see active duty end strength coming down to the projected figure of 174,000.

²⁸Robert Williams, "Aspin's Bottom-Up Review Portends Significant Cuts," National Defense, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 491, October 1993, p. 13-14.

A similar pattern emerges for the reserves. Gradual decreases occur from fiscal year 1990 to 1993, and as per the Bottom-Up review, end strength levels out at 42,000 from fiscal year 1994-1999. Table 6.2 shows the percentage increases and decreases for each fiscal year. Also, Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show that relative to the active component, reserve end strength has fared better.

TABLE 6.2
Marine Corps End Strength (Active and Reserve) 1990's

| <u>Year</u> | <u>MPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> | <u>RPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> |
|-------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1990 | 196,652 | 0% | 0% | 44,530 | 0% | 0% |
| 1991 | 195,000 | (0.84%) | (0.84%) | 43,973 | (1.25%) | (1.25%) |
| 1992 | 184,590 | (5.34%) | (6.18%) | 42,572 | (3.19%) | (4.44%) |
| 1993 | 178,379 | (3.36%) | (9.54%) | 41,854 | (1.69%) | (6.12%) |
| 1994 | 174,100 | (2.40%) | (11.94%) | 42,000 | 0.35% | (5.77%) |
| 1995 | 174,000 | (0.06%) | (12.00%) | 42,000 | 0% | (5.77%) |
| 1996 | 174,000 | 0% | (12.00%) | 42,000 | 0% | (5.77%) |
| 1997 | 174,000 | 0% | (12.00%) | 42,000 | 0% | (5.77%) |
| 1998 | 174,000 | 0% | (12.00%) | 42,000 | 0% | (5.77%) |
| 1999 | 174,000 | 0% | (12.00%) | 42,000 | 0% | (5.77%) |

Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, (series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990-1993, and FY1994 Future Year Defense Program.

Personnel funding again shows the same pattern. The early 1990's are marked by decreases, with the exception of fiscal year 1991. During fiscal year 1991 the Marine Corps was involved in Operation Desert Storm/Shield. Because of the mobilization of the reserves, all pay and allowances for the reserves had to come from MPMC because they were now part of the active force. Correspondingly, RPMC took a \$52 million funding cut because the reserves were not incurring any training costs as a result of their

FIGURE 6.1: MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH
(% Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE





FIGURE 6.2: MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH
(% Cum Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE



Source: Derived from Table 6.2

□ MPMC + RPMC

involvement in Operation Desert Storm/Shield.²⁹ During fiscal years 1994-1999, both MPMC and RPMC experience only minor increases. (See Table 6.3 and Figures 6.3 and 6.4)

TABLE 6.3
Marine Corps Personnel Funding (Active and Reserve) 1990's
(\$000)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>MPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> | <u>RPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> |
|-------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1990 | 5,798,822 | 0% | 0% | 314,383 | 0% | 0% |
| 1991 | 6,374,780 | 9.93% | 9.93% | 285,685 | (9.13%) | (9.13%) |
| 1992 | 6,102,580 | (4.27%) | 5.66% | 345,007 | 20.76% | 11.64% |
| 1993 | 5,980,998 | (1.99%) | 3.67% | 347,103 | 0.61% | 12.24% |
| 1994 | 5,678,700 | (5.05%) | (1.38%) | 350,569 | 1.00% | 13.24% |
| 1995 | 5,686,490 | 0.14% | (1.25%) | 343,843 | (1.92%) | 11.32% |
| 1996 | 5,774,964 | 1.56% | 0.31% | 350,936 | 2.06% | 13.39% |
| 1997 | 5,831,611 | 0.98% | 1.29% | 355,924 | 1.42% | 14.81% |
| 1998 | 5,962,734 | 1.73% | 3.02% | 364,077 | 2.29% | 17.10% |
| 1999 | 6,062,098 | 1.67% | 4.70% | 371,212 | 1.96% | 19.06% |

Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, (series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990-1993, and FY1994 Future Year Defense Program.

Operation and Maintenance funding for the active and reserve components are pretty much the same as MPMC and RPMC. The early 1990's show decreases, with the exception of fiscal year 1991. Again the irregularity caused by fiscal year 1991 is because of Operation Desert Storm/Shield. During fiscal years 1994-1999 we see steady uneventful inflationary increases. (See Table 6.4 and Figures 6.5 and 6.6)

²⁹Estimated expenditures - Actual expenditures:
 (\$338 million - \$286 million) = \$52 million.

FIGURE 6.3: MARINE CORPS FUNDING
(% Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE





FIGURE 6.4: MARINE CORPS FUNDING
(% Cum Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE



Source: Derived from Table 6.3


□ MPMC + RPMC

TABLE 6.4
Marine Corps Operations and Maintenance (Active and Reserve) 1990's
(\$000)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>O&MMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> | <u>O&MMCR</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> |
|-------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1990 | 1,850,507 | 0% | 0% | 78,382 | 0% | 0% |
| 1991 | 3,225,182 | 74.29% | 74.29% | 84,696 | 8.06% | 8.06% |
| 1992 | 2,146,464 | (33.45%) | 40.84% | 92,833 | 9.61% | 17.66% |
| 1993 | 1,976,330 | (7.93%) | 32.91% | 80,035 | (13.79%) | 3.88% |
| 1994 | 1,818,000 | (8.01%) | 24.90% | 75,100 | (6.17%) | (2.29%) |
| 1995 | 1,745,146 | (4.01%) | 20.89% | 78,518 | 4.55% | 2.26% |
| 1996 | 1,893,768 | 8.52% | 29.41% | 80,480 | 2.50% | 4.76% |
| 1997 | 1,988,799 | 5.02% | 34.43% | 82,331 | 2.30% | 7.06% |
| 1998 | 2,035,417 | 2.34% | 36.77% | 84,225 | 2.30% | 9.36% |
| 1999 | 2,137,167 | 5.00% | 41.77% | 86,163 | 2.30% | 11.66% |

Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, (series), Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990-1993, and FY1994 Future Year Defense Program.


**FIGURE 6.5: OPERATION & MAINTENANCE
(% Change)**



Source: Derived from Table 6.4

FIGURE 6.6: OPERATION & MAINTENANCE

(% Cum Change)



Source: Derived from Table 6.4

□ ACTIVE + RESERVE

D. CONCLUSION

The United States finds itself as the only superpower in the world. With Soviet Union no longer representing the menacing threat that it used to, the United States has reshaped its military to meet other contingencies. Those contingencies will probably entail small regional conflicts which will not require huge military forces. The data presented, as it pertains to the Marine Corps, reflects this strategy. This new strategy shows the Marine Corps becoming smaller relative to the 1980's and its reserve force remaining at an end strength of 42,000 ready to augment, reinforce, reconstitute the active component.

VII. CONCLUSION

A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER

Now that all the data has been analyzed, this chapter will try to make sense of the relationship between the active and reserve components of the Marine Corps. Also addressed will be the future of the Marine Corps Reserve.

B. ANALYSIS OF DATA (Decade Comparison)

The percentage increases and decreases for the active and reserve end strengths followed the same pattern in the early 1960's. As the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war increased, so did the active duty end strength, whereas the reserve end strength remained stable. Throughout the rest of the 1960's, reserve end strength again remained stable largely because they were not mobilized during the Vietnam conflict.

The early 1970's show dramatic decreases in active and reserve end strengths. These decreases were to be expected as the Vietnam war came to a close. But after these initial end strength decreases, the active duty end strength remained stable, whereas the reserve end strength remained in a continuous state of flux. With the implementation of the Total Force Policy in the early 1970's, the reserves were expected to receive greater emphasis, but not until the late 1970's did reserve end strength increase.

The 1980's show stable end strengths for the active component. With the Reagan Administration's emphasis on rebuilding the military and the Total Force Policy serving as a guide, the active

component saw initial increases in the early 1980's, but the late 1980's show small decreases in end strength largely as a result of the turn of events in the Soviet Union.

The reserve component end strengths also show steady increases throughout the 1980's. This can be attributed to the Total Force Policy which emphasized greater dependence on the reserve forces.

The 1990's show decreases in end strength for both the active and reserve components. With the Soviet Union no longer considered the formidable foe of the past, military strategy has yielded to the Bush Administration's Base Force concept and most recently to the Clinton Administration's Bottom-Up review. (See Table 7.1 and Figures 7.1 and 7.2)

Personnel funding for the active and reserve components show interesting patterns from 1960 to 1999. The 1960's show active and reserve funding percentage increases and decreases following the same pattern, with the exception of the Vietnam war.

The 1970's again show active and reserve personnel funding experiencing similar percentage increases and decreases, with the exception of the early 1970's, where both the MPMC and RPMC appropriations experienced the post Vietnam draw down.

The 1980's show significant increases in the MPMC and RPMC appropriations. Again these increases were the result of the Reagan build-up, with the RPMC appropriation showing continuously larger percentage increases than the MPMC appropriation.

The 1990's show both appropriations as very stable. As expected with the decline of the Soviet Union, funding levels

TABLE 7.1
Marine Corps End Strength (Active and Reserve) 1960-1999

| <u>Year</u> | <u>MPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> | <u>RPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> |
|-------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1960 | 170,621 | 0% | 0% | 46,470 | 0% | 0% |
| 1961 | 176,909 | 3.69% | 3.69% | 45,975 | (1.07%) | (1.07%) |
| 1962 | 190,962 | 7.94% | 11.63% | 48,608 | 5.73% | 4.66% |
| 1963 | 189,683 | (0.67%) | 10.96% | 48,102 | (1.04%) | 3.62% |
| 1964 | 189,751 | 0.04% | 11.00% | 47,927 | (0.36%) | 3.26% |
| 1965 | 190,187 | 0.23% | 11.22% | 48,243 | 0.66% | 3.92% |
| 1966 | 261,687 | 38.00% | 48.82% | 51,256 | 6.25% | 10.16% |
| 1967 | 278,145 | 6.00% | 55.11% | 49,788 | (2.86%) | 7.30% |
| 1968 | 307,252 | 10.00% | 65.57% | 47,983 | (3.63%) | 3.67% |
| 1969 | 309,771 | 0.82% | 66.39% | 49,908 | 4.00% | 7.68% |
| 1970 | 259,737 | (16.15%) | 50.24% | 48,575 | (2.67%) | 5.01% |
| 1971 | 212,369 | (18.24%) | 32.00% | 47,761 | (1.68%) | 3.34% |
| 1972 | 198,238 | (6.65%) | 25.35% | 41,484 | (13.14%) | (9.80%) |
| 1973 | 196,098 | (1.08%) | 24.27% | 38,196 | (7.93%) | (17.73%) |
| 1974 | 188,802 | (3.72%) | 20.55% | 31,896 | (16.49%) | (34.22%) |
| 1975 | 195,951 | (3.79%) | 24.34% | 33,089 | 3.74% | (30.48%) |
| 1976 | 192,336 | (1.84%) | 22.49% | 26,849 | (18.86%) | (49.34%) |
| 1977 | 191,641 | (0.36%) | 22.13% | 31,687 | 18.02% | (31.32%) |
| 1978 | 190,755 | (0.46%) | 21.67% | 33,403 | 5.42% | (25.91%) |
| 1979 | 185,187 | (2.92%) | 18.75% | 34,280 | 2.63% | (23.28%) |
| 1980 | 188,469 | 1.77% | 20.52% | 37,038 | 8.05% | (15.24%) |
| 1981 | 190,620 | 1.14% | 21.66% | 37,049 | 0.03% | (15.21%) |
| 1982 | 192,059 | 0.75% | 22.42% | 40,461 | 9.21% | (6.00%) |
| 1983 | 194,089 | 1.07% | 23.47% | 42,690 | 5.51% | (0.49%) |
| 1984 | 196,189 | 1.08% | 24.56% | 40,619 | (4.85%) | (5.34%) |
| 1985 | 198,025 | 0.94% | 25.49% | 41,586 | 2.38% | (2.96%) |
| 1986 | 198,814 | 0.40% | 25.89% | 41,582 | (0.01%) | (2.97%) |
| 1987 | 199,527 | 0.36% | 26.25% | 42,253 | 1.61% | (1.36%) |
| 1988 | 197,350 | (1.09%) | 25.16% | 43,556 | 3.08% | 1.73% |
| 1989 | 195,558 | (0.91%) | 24.25% | 43,576 | 0.05% | 1.77% |
| 1990 | 196,652 | 0.56% | 24.81% | 44,530 | 2.19% | 3.96% |
| 1991 | 195,000 | (0.84%) | 23.97% | 43,973 | (1.25%) | 2.71% |
| 1992 | 184,590 | (5.34%) | 18.63% | 42,572 | (3.19%) | (0.47%) |
| 1993 | 178,379 | (3.36%) | 15.27% | 41,854 | (1.69%) | (2.16%) |
| 1994 | 174,100 | (2.40%) | 12.87% | 42,000 | 0.35% | (1.81%) |
| 1995 | 174,000 | (0.06%) | 12.81% | 42,000 | 0% | (1.81%) |
| 1996 | 174,000 | 0% | 12.81% | 42,000 | 0% | (1.81%) |
| 1997 | 174,000 | 0% | 12.81% | 42,000 | 0% | (1.81%) |
| 1998 | 174,000 | 0% | 12.81% | 42,000 | 0% | (1.81%) |
| 1999 | 174,000 | 0% | 12.81% | 42,000 | 0% | (1.81%) |

Sources: Budget of the United States Government (series) 1960-1993 and FY1994 Future Years Defense Program

FIGURE 7.1: MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH
(% Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE





FIGURE 7.2: MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH
(% Cum Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE



Source: Derived from Table 7.1

within the Department of Defense have decreased. (See Table 7.2 and Figure 7.3 and 7.4) When taking inflation into account, funding for the Department of Defense has been declining since the mid-1980's.

The operation and maintenance funding for the active and reserve components from 1960 to 1999 takes on virtually the same pattern as the MPMC and RPMC appropriations. Looking at the curves, one can see the similar patterns. (See Table 7.3 and Figures 7.5 and 7.6)

C. CONCLUSION

Now that all the data has been analyzed, what does it all mean? The graphs indicate differences and similarities throughout the decades between the reserve and active duty appropriations. But most importantly, they show the relationship between the active and reserve appropriations and also the emphasis placed on these appropriations throughout the four decades in question.

Throughout history, Reserve Forces in various countries have had to face the stigma of being classified as second class citizens by the regular military establishment. Because of their part-time service they have consistently faced contempt from their active duty counterparts for not being as competent or as professional. The Marine Corps Reserve, inspite of decades of solid performance, i.e., World War II, the Korean War, and Desert Storm/Shield, still faces this stigma.

TABLE 7.2

Marine Corps Personnel Funding (Active and Reserve) 1960-1999
(\$000)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>MPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>% Cum Change</u> | <u>RPMC</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>% Cum Change</u> |
|-------------|-------------|-----------------|---------------------|-------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| 1960 | 597,962 | 0% | 0% | 24,066 | 0% | 0% |
| 1961 | 602,063 | 0.69% | 0.69% | 24,385 | 1.33% | 1.33% |
| 1962 | 639,330 | 5.83% | 6.88% | 25,994 | 6.60% | 7.92% |
| 1963 | 664,740 | 3.97% | 10.85% | 26,662 | 2.57% | 10.49% |
| 1964 | 725,424 | 9.13% | 19.98% | 29,497 | 10.63% | 21.13% |
| 1965 | 753,392 | 3.86% | 23.83% | 30,899 | 4.75% | 25.88% |
| 1966 | 978,247 | 29.85% | 53.68% | 36,133 | 16.94% | 42.82% |
| 1967 | 1,250,378 | 27.89% | 81.50% | 36,933 | 2.21% | 45.03% |
| 1968 | 1,430,689 | 14.42% | 95.92% | 35,875 | (2.86%) | 42.17% |
| 1969 | 1,534,734 | 7.27% | 103.19% | 36,357 | 1.34% | 43.51% |
| 1970 | 1,627,084 | 6.02% | 109.21% | 48,847 | 34.35% | 77.87% |
| 1971 | 1,461,640 | (10.17%) | 99.04% | 53,672 | 9.88% | 87.74% |
| 1972 | 1,455,792 | (0.40%) | 98.64% | 58,144 | 8.33% | 96.08% |
| 1973 | 1,577,722 | 8.38% | 107.02% | 68,375 | 17.60% | 113.67% |
| 1974 | 1,660,636 | 5.26% | 112.27% | 60,490 | (11.53%) | 102.14% |
| 1975 | 1,745,766 | 5.17% | 117.40% | 65,122 | 7.66% | 109.80% |
| 1976 | 1,851,277 | 6.04% | 123.44% | 70,967 | 8.98% | 118.77% |
| 1977 | 1,900,124 | 2.64% | 126.08% | 73,697 | 4.23% | 123.00% |
| 1978 | 2,013,704 | 5.98% | 132.06% | 82,196 | 11.13% | 134.12% |
| 1979 | 2,098,462 | 4.21% | 136.27% | 83,903 | 2.08% | 136.20% |
| 1980 | 2,235,310 | 6.52% | 142.79% | 96,090 | 14.53% | 150.73% |
| 1981 | 2,666,610 | 19.29% | 162.08% | 118,955 | 23.80% | 174.52% |
| 1982 | 3,111,829 | 16.70% | 178.78% | 151,281 | 27.17% | 201.70% |
| 1983 | 3,347,565 | 7.58% | 186.35% | 169,889 | 12.30% | 214.00% |
| 1984 | 3,516,338 | 5.04% | 191.40% | 172,248 | 1.39% | 215.39% |
| 1985 | 4,952,473 | 40.84% | 232.24% | 269,930 | 56.71% | 272.10% |
| 1986 | 5,161,083 | 4.21% | 236.45% | 283,045 | 4.86% | 276.95% |
| 1987 | 5,438,786 | 5.38% | 241.83% | 277,316 | (2.02%) | 274.93% |
| 1988 | 5,562,912 | 2.28% | 244.11% | 294,200 | 6.09% | 281.02% |
| 1989 | 5,678,983 | 2.09% | 246.20% | 314,980 | 7.06% | 288.08% |
| 1990 | 5,798,822 | 2.11% | 248.31% | 314,383 | (0.19%) | 287.89% |
| 1991 | 6,374,780 | 9.93% | 258.24% | 285,685 | (9.13%) | 278.76% |
| 1992 | 6,102,580 | (4.27%) | 253.97% | 345,007 | 20.76% | 299.53% |
| 1993 | 5,980,998 | (1.99%) | 251.98% | 347,103 | 0.61% | 300.14% |
| 1994 | 5,678,700 | (5.05%) | 246.93% | 350,569 | 1.00% | 301.14% |
| 1995 | 5,686,490 | 0.14% | 247.06% | 343,843 | (1.92%) | 299.22% |
| 1996 | 5,774,964 | 1.56% | 248.62% | 350,936 | 2.06% | 301.28% |
| 1997 | 5,831,611 | 0.98% | 249.60% | 355,924 | 1.42% | 302.70% |
| 1998 | 5,962,734 | 1.73% | 251.33% | 364,077 | 2.29% | 304.99% |
| 1999 | 6,062,098 | 1.67% | 253.01% | 371,212 | 1.96% | 306.95% |

Sources: Budget of the United States Government (series) 1960-1993 and FY1994 Future Years Defense Program

FIGURE 7.3: MARINE CORPS FUNDING
(% Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE





FIGURE 7.4: MARINE CORPS FUNDING
(% Cum Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE



Source: Derived from Table 7.2

TABLE 7.3
Marine Corps O & M (Active and Reserve) 1960-1999
($\$000$)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Active</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> | <u>Reserve</u> | <u>% Change</u> | <u>%Cum Change</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1960 | 165,041 | 0% | 0% | 4,647 | 0% | 0% |
| 1961 | 171,161 | 3.71% | 3.71% | 4,262 | (8.28%) | (8.28%) |
| 1962 | 181,093 | 5.80% | 9.51% | 4,565 | 7.11% | (1.18%) |
| 1963 | 182,592 | 0.83% | 10.34% | 4,550 | (0.33%) | (1.50%) |
| 1964 | 185,088 | 1.33% | 11.71% | 4,802 | 5.54% | 4.03% |
| 1965 | 189,225 | 2.24% | 13.94% | 4,769 | (0.69%) | 3.35% |
| 1966 | 327,479 | 73.06% | 87.00% | 5,097 | 6.88% | 10.22% |
| 1967 | 423,298 | 29.26% | 116.26% | 5,856 | 14.89% | 25.12% |
| 1968 | 427,322 | 0.95% | 117.21% | 6,637 | 13.34% | 38.45% |
| 1969 | 452,751 | 5.95% | 123.17% | 5,999 | (9.61%) | 28.84% |
| 1970 | 400,219 | (11.60%) | 111.56% | 6,395 | 6.60% | 34.44% |
| 1971 | 394,727 | (1.37%) | 110.19% | 8,601 | 34.50% | 69.94% |
| 1972 | 353,191 | (10.52%) | 101.93% | 8,094 | (5.89%) | 64.04% |
| 1973 | 383,139 | 8.48% | 107.73% | 7,945 | (1.84%) | 62.20% |
| 1974 | 441,540 | 15.24% | 122.98% | 12,094 | 52.22% | 114.42% |
| 1975 | 458,869 | 3.92% | 126.90% | 11,611 | (3.99%) | 110.43% |
| 1976 | 512,203 | 11.62% | 138.52% | 11,739 | 1.10% | 111.53% |
| 1977 | 591,313 | 15.45% | 153.97% | 15,008 | 27.85% | 139.38% |
| 1978 | 657,517 | 11.20% | 165.17% | 16,257 | 8.32% | 147.70% |
| 1979 | 745,082 | 13.32% | 178.48% | 19,660 | 20.93% | 168.63% |
| 1980 | 880,167 | 18.13% | 196.61% | 21,155 | 7.60% | 176.24% |
| 1981 | 1,089,839 | 23.82% | 220.44% | 28,594 | 35.16% | 211.40% |
| 1982 | 1,181,103 | 8.37% | 228.81% | 39,762 | 39.06% | 250.46% |
| 1983 | 1,479,412 | 25.26% | 254.07% | 50,453 | 26.89% | 277.35% |
| 1984 | 1,559,971 | 5.45% | 259.51% | 52,111 | 3.29% | 280.63% |
| 1985 | 1,657,778 | 6.27% | 265.78% | 58,669 | 12.58% | 293.22% |
| 1986 | 1,575,629 | (4.93%) | 260.83% | 54,357 | (7.35%) | 285.87% |
| 1987 | 1,841,427 | 16.87% | 277.70% | 63,978 | 17.70% | 303.57% |
| 1988 | 1,800,488 | (2.22%) | 275.47% | 69,500 | 8.63% | 312.20% |
| 1989 | 1,839,947 | 2.19% | 277.66% | 77,417 | 11.39% | 323.59% |
| 1990 | 1,850,507 | 0.57% | 278.24% | 78,382 | 1.25% | 324.84% |
| 1991 | 3,225,182 | 74.29% | 352.52% | 84,696 | 8.06% | 332.89% |
| 1992 | 2,146,464 | (33.45%) | 319.08% | 92,833 | 9.61% | 342.50% |
| 1993 | 1,976,330 | (7.93%) | 311.15% | 80,035 | (13.79%) | 328.71% |
| 1994 | 1,818,000 | (8.01%) | 303.14% | 75,100 | (6.17%) | 322.55% |
| 1995 | 1,745,146 | (4.01%) | 299.13% | 78,518 | 4.55% | 327.10% |
| 1996 | 1,893,768 | 8.52% | 307.65% | 80,480 | 2.50% | 329.60% |
| 1997 | 1,988,799 | 5.02% | 312.67% | 82,331 | 2.30% | 331.90% |
| 1998 | 2,035,417 | 2.34% | 315.01% | 84,225 | 2.30% | 334.20% |
| 1999 | 2,137,167 | 5.00% | 320.01% | 86,163 | 2.30% | 336.50% |

Sources: Budget of the United States Government (series) 1960-1993 and FY1994 Future Years Defense Program

FIGURE 7.5: OPERATION & MAINTENANCE
(% Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE





FIGURE 7.6: OPERATION & MAINTENANCE
(% Cum. Change)

% INCREASE/DECREASE



Source: Derived from Table 7.3

Barbara W. Tuchman, in The Guns of August, shows the regular establishment's contempt for reservists during the World War I era from the German and French perspective:

Reserves mixed with active troops would create 'armies of decadence,' incapable of the will to conquer.... Similar sentiments were known to be held across the Rhine. The Kaiser was widely credited with the edict 'no fathers at the front.' Among the French General Staff it was an article of faith that the Germans would not mix reserve units with active units.³⁰

In 1973, Chief Warrant Officer William K. Laird, further explains that:

The attitude and fact that the reservist is a second-class serviceman permeates the program from the Congress down to the individual. Let's be realistic and stop vilifying the reservist as if he were somewhat less patriotic than his regular counterpart.³¹

In 1981, Captain L.A. Johnson writes that:

There exists a school of thought that maintains or implies that reservists are second-class citizens. It is a widespread pervasive school of thought and one that needs to be dispelled.³²

In 1991 LtCol. M.F. Cancian writes about Marine reservists in Operation Desert Storm/Shield by saying that "... many reservists felt that the regulars did not treat them as a member of the team."³³ He continues by commenting that:

Active duty commanders should know that reservists are hypersensitive, even a bit paranoid about being considered

³⁰Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1962, p. 32.

³¹CWO William K. Laird, "Cure Offered for Reserves," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 57, No. 8, August 1973., p. 52.

³²Capt. L.A. Johnson, "Second-Class Citizen," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 65, No. 8, August 1981, p. 58.

³³LtCol. M.F. Cancian, Forces in Southwest Asia, p. 56.

second class citizens. Even casual slights or 'good natured' kidding can be misinterpreted. Strong action is needed to prevent an 'us' v. 'them' atmosphere from arising.³⁴

Even though this "us" v. "them" syndrome continues to exist, the data throughout the four decades sheds some light on the reliance and responsibility that has been shouldered by the reserves.

This reliance on the reserves is directly predicated on the existing military strategy of the time. It should be noted that the Marine Corps is a force in readiness, prepared to move quickly at any given time to any part of the world. With such a mission, and such short response time, the reserves find themselves at a disadvantage because of the long lead times required to mobilize the reserves. The Marine Corps, as opposed to the Army, is much less dependent on its reserve force. Therefore any lack of reliance or perceived lack of reliance on the reserves is much more a factor of its mission as opposed to blatant disregard for the reserves.

The objective during the Cold War was the containment of communism. The strategies that were implemented in accomplishing this objective were continuously evolving. Throughout the 1960's and the early 1970's the probability of nuclear war was very likely, but not until the mid to late 1970's, when the United States and the Soviet Union realized that any nuclear war would mean mutual destruction, did military planners start espousing a strategy geared towards a conventional war. This conventional war

³⁴Ibid., p. 56.

scenario envisioned long protracted battles fought on European soil. Such a scenario lends itself much more to the mobilization of reserves because enough time is available to mobilize them.

But with the demise of the Soviet Union, military planners have changed their strategy once again. As per the Clinton Administration's Bottom-Up review, Marine Corps end strength is expected to drop to 174,000 by 1995, down from its post Vietnam peak in 1987 of 199,527. The reserve end strength is expected to remain steady at 42,000 from 1994 to 1999, still a decrease from its post Vietnam high of 44,530 in 1990. Future scenarios are predicted to be small regional conflicts with quick response times.

LtCol. Cancian explains:

The assumption for these regional conflicts is for short warning times and short conflicts. This requires very responsive forces. No longer is it 'better late than never,' but rather 'better never than late' i.e.,³⁵ forces that cannot deploy rapidly are not worth maintaining.³⁵

Although LtCol. Cancian sees the 1990's as not very good years for the Marine Corps Reserve, if one looks at the end strength numbers, one can definitely see that relative decreases in end strength have tended to favor the reserves. Additionally, with defense dollars becoming smaller, the Pentagon has continuously tried to cut the reserves in proportion with the regular establishment, but Congress continues to support the reserves both in end strength and funding.

With this congressional support, the Marine Corps Reserve has remained a viable force in support of the active component.

³⁵Ibid., p. 3.

In July 1992 the Marine Reserve Force was established. Major General J.W. Oster, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, explains that:

Marine Reserve Force provides a single point of contact through which the Commandant, as the Service Chief, can discharge his responsibility to the Secretary of the Navy for the timely provision of trained and equipped Reserve units and individuals to the combatant commands. Consolidation of Marine Reserve assets under a single headquarters provides better visibility of available resources and reduces the potential for overcommitment and disruption of contingency plan execution. Marine Reserve Force streamlines the Reserve Component and eliminates duplicate functions among various staffs. It also increases command opportunities for senior Reserve Component officers. Command and control of the Reserve Component is strengthened as a result of the activation of Marine Reserve Force.³⁶

With this streamlining of its command structure and the continued emphasis on the Total Force Policy, the Marine Corps Reserve is positioned to support the active component throughout the 1990's.

Some have argued that as the active component decreases, the reserves should be increased in order to maintain a strong military capability and at the same time save on manpower costs. For the Marine Corps that would be a mistake. Because the Marine Corps thrives on its quick response time to deploy to any part of the world, increased reliability on the reserves would negatively affect capability. Additionally, as the active component decreases, the manpower pool of prior service personnel would shrink and the reserves would be required to recruit personnel without prior military service. In essence, the relationship between active and reserve components as it exists today, allows

³⁶Statement by MGen. J.W. Oster, 28 April 1993, Hearings before the House Armed Services Committee, p. 4.

the Marine Corps to accomplish its mission. Also, any drastic reductions in the reserve component would deviate from the Total Force Policy, ...From the Sea (Navy-Marine Corps policy document), and current congressional opinion.

Without question, from 1960 to the present, the Total Force Policy has been the key toward increased reliance on the reserves. End strength and funding data in this thesis illustrate this increased reliance. Because reserves are generally cheaper than their active duty counterparts, Congress in its attempt to save money, deal with the national budget deficit, and maintain its constituency, will ensure that the reserves receive adequate support and remain a viable entity.

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